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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Nicholas Bergamatto appeals from the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment against him on his claims under 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 
3 
 
U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.  He contends that, under his pension plan, 
he is entitled to more benefits than he was awarded and that 
ERISA allows him to sue a “de facto administrator” of the plan 
for failing to provide requested information.  We disagree and 
so will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
 The operative facts are not in dispute.  Bergamatto 
began working for the Port of New York and New Jersey as a 
longshoreman in 2000.  He last worked there in April 2010.  In 
April 2013, he applied for retirement benefits under his 
pension plan.   
 
 That plan is the New York Shipping Association-
International Longshoremen’s Association Pension Trust Fund 
and Plan, a plan covered by ERISA.  The 2010 version of the 
plan said that “[t]he provisions … in effect during the 
Participant’s last year of credited service shall be applied to 
determine the Participant’s right to benefits and the amount 
thereof.”  (Supp. App. at 5.)  The 2010 plan also originally 
precluded longshoremen hired between October 1996 and 
September 2004 from accruing benefits for work performed 
before October 2004.1  It did so by excluding from the 
definition of “Participant” “any employee who was not a 
Participant prior to October 1, 1996” and stating that: 
 
                                              
1 At all times relevant to this case, a year of credited 
service required a set number of hours of credited service and 




[n]otwithstanding anything to the contrary 
contained in this Plan, any person who was first 
hired for employment in the longshore industry 
on or after October 1, 1996, and who was not a 
Participant as of September 30, 2004, shall be 
eligible to participate as a Participant in the Plan 
effective October 1, 2004, but shall not be 
entitled to accrue credited service for pension 
benefit accrual purposes under the Plan for any 
hours of employment earned prior to October 1, 
2004. 
(Supp. App. at 10-11.)   
 
 In 2013, however, an amendment was made to the 2010 
plan.  That amendment provided that, “[e]ffective October 1, 
2012, Participants hired on or after October 1, 1996 shall 
receive pension benefit accruals for years of credited service 
earned from 1996 through 2004[.]”  (D. Ct. D.I. 31-3, at 
*173.)2   
 
 The 2010 plan contained several administrative 
provisions.  Among other things, it said that “[t]he Fund shall 
be administered by a Board of Trustees” (Supp. App. at 65) and 
that the Board had to “make available to the Fund’s 
Participants and beneficiaries such reports and other 
documents as are required by ERISA” (Supp. App. at 68).  It 
further provided that 
 
                                              





[t]he Board of Trustees shall have sole and 
absolute discretionary authority (1) to determine 
eligibility for benefits, (2) to interpret and 
construe the terms and provisions of the Trust 
and Plan, and (3) to make factual findings in 
connection with applications for benefits and to 
make other determinations involving application 
of the provisions of the Trust and Plan. 
 (Supp. App. at 73.)  Finally, it said that the Board “delegates 
to the Executive Pension Director … the power and authority 
to process and approve all non-disputed applications for 
pension benefits and to commence timely payments of such 
benefits” but that “[a]ll actions taken and decisions made 
pursuant to [that delegation] are subject to ratification by the 
Board of Trustees.”3  (Supp. App. at 73.) 
 
 In January 2015, an updated version of the plan was 
produced.  Like the 2010 plan, the 2015 plan contained a “last 
year of credited service” clause, saying that “[t]he provisions 
of the Plan in effect during the Participant’s last Year of 
Credited Service shall be applied to determine the Participant’s 
                                              
3 Although the record is not entirely clear, it appears that 
the “Executive Pension Director” is the same individual 
elsewhere referred to as the Executive Director of the Fund.  
The delegated power of the Director in handling benefits 
applications is to be exercised in concert with “his counterpart 
designated by the [New York Shipping Association.]”  (Supp. 
App. at 73.)  That aspect of the plan’s administration is not at 
issue in this case. 
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right to benefit and the amount thereof.”4  (App. at 70.)  The 
2015 plan also expressly incorporated the 2013 amendment to 
the 2010 plan, providing that, “[e]ffective October 1, 2012, 
Participants hired on or after October 1, 1996 shall receive 
pension benefit accruals for Years of Credited Service earned 
from 1996 through 2004.”  (App. at 58.)  Relatedly, it 
eliminated the language preventing employees hired between 
October 1996 and September 2004 from accruing benefits for 
work prior to October 2004.  The 2015 plan also contained the 
same administrative provisions from the 2010 plan that have 
just been noted.   
 
 In June 2013, Bergamatto’s application for pension 
benefits was approved by Charles Ward, Executive Director of 
the Fund, but based on only the years of credited service 
starting in October 2004.  Ward reasoned that the 2010 plan 
required that benefit determinations be made based on the plan 
provisions in force during the participant’s last year of credited 
service, that Bergamatto’s last year of credited service was 
2010, and that the 2010 plan terms prevented longshoremen 
hired between October 1996 and September 2004 – like 
Bergamatto – from receiving benefit accruals for work 
performed before October 2004.   
 
 Bergamatto responded to Ward’s decision by requesting 
that, in light of the 2013 amendment to the 2010 plan, his 
pension benefits incorporate his years of service before 
October 2004.  A series of communications between Ward and 
Bergamatto ensued, which ultimately led to Bergamatto 
                                              
4 The 2010 plan used the word “benefits” (Supp. App. 
at 5, 34), whereas the 2015 plan used “benefit” (App. at 70).  
The change does not appear to have been substantive. 
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accusing Ward of failing to respond to him as required by 
ERISA.  Specifically, Bergamatto maintained that Ward had 
not adequately addressed his request for the pre-October 2004 
benefit accruals and for the relevant plan provisions or 
summary plan description.   
 
 Bergamatto ultimately filed an appeal with the pension 
fund’s Board of Trustees, which denied the appeal after a 
hearing.  Its decision was based on the following reasoning: the 
2015 plan “provides that the provisions of the Plan in effect 
during the Participant’s last year of credited service shall be 
applied to determine the Participant’s right to a benefit and the 
amount thereof”; Bergamatto’s last year of credited service 
was 2010; the 2010 plan likewise “provides, with various 
exceptions that apply only to the amount of benefits, that the 
provisions of the Plan in effect during the Participant’s last 
year of credited service shall be applied to determine the 
Participant’s right to benefits and the amount thereof”; and the 
2010 plan further “provides that … any person who was hired 
… on or after October 1, 1996, and who was not a Participant 
as of September 30, 2004, shall be eligible to participate as a 
Participant in the Plan effective October 1, 2004, but shall not 
be entitled to accrue credited service for pension benefit 
accrual purposes under the Plan for any hour of employment 
earned prior to October 1, 2004[.]’”  (D. Ct. D.I. 31-3, at *206-
07.)   
 
 The Board’s decision was communicated to 
Bergamatto, and he then filed this action under ERISA, naming 
the Board of Trustees and Ward as defendants.5  He claimed 
                                              




first that the denial of his claim for pre-October 2004 benefit 
accruals was erroneous, as it was based on a misinterpretation 
of the plan provisions and, second, that Ward’s failure to 
adequately respond during the parties’ correspondence 
amounted to a violation of the statutory responsibility of the 
plan administrator to respond to a plan participant.6  The 
defendants ultimately moved for summary judgment, which 
the District Court granted.   
 
 As to Bergamatto’s first claim, the Court concluded 
that, under the applicable “arbitrary-and-capricious standard” 
of review, the Board of Trustees’ interpretation of the 2015 and 
2010 plans was “reasonably consistent” with the plans’ 
unambiguous language, which “makes clear that Bergamatto 
was not eligible for benefit accruals” for the years that he 
worked before October 2004.  (App. at 15-16 (citation 
omitted).)  Mirroring the Board’s reasoning, the Court said 
that, under the 2015 plan, the terms in place during a 
participant’s last year of credited service are controlling for 
purposes of benefit determinations; that Bergamatto’s last year 
of credited service was 2010; and that, therefore, the 2010 plan 
governs Bergamatto’s claim.  It then concluded that the 2010 
plan also requires that the provisions in effect during a 
participant’s last year of credited service control.  The Court 
said that the 2010 provisions preclude workers like Bergamatto 
from earning benefit accruals for years of service before 
October 2004, and that the 2013 amendment allowing such 
accruals was not in effect in 2010.  It rejected Bergamatto’s 
assertion that the “last year of credited service” clause does not 
                                              
6 Bergamatto raised other issues, but the District Court 
concluded “that he is no longer pursuing” them (App. at 12 
n.5), and Bergamatto does not press them on appeal.   
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apply, saying instead that “the Clause does clearly apply to 
such accruals.”  (App. at 17.)  The Court also disagreed with 
Bergamatto’s contention that Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 
553 (3d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Fifth Third 
Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 417-19 (2014), 
dictated a result in his favor.  According to the Court, 
Bergamatto’s Moench argument failed because the Board’s 
interpretation was consistent with the goals of the plan, did not 
render any language in the plan meaningless or internally 
inconsistent, did not conflict with ERISA, was not inconsistent 
with other Board interpretations, and was consistent with the 
clear language of the plan.   
 
 As to Bergamatto’s second claim – that Ward breached 
an obligation to respond to Bergamatto’s requests for 
information – the District Court observed that the claim was 
misdirected since the plan identifies the Board of Trustees, not 
Ward, as the administrator.  The Court rejected Bergamatto’s 
argument “that Ward is the de facto plan administrator[,]” 
reasoning that “the plain and unambiguous text of ERISA, as 
well as the weight of existing case law,” foreclosed that 
argument.  (App. at 20-21.)  It noted that, although “[t]he Third 
Circuit has not yet ruled on” “whether a party can be held liable 
under [29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1)] under a de facto plan 
administrator theory[,]” numerous other circuit courts and the 
District of New Jersey have rejected that theory.  (App. at 20.)   
 
 The Court also rebuffed two alternative arguments 
advanced by Bergamatto: that equitable estoppel should apply 
because “Ward ‘never disavowed the title of Plan 
Administrator and never advised Bergamatto’s counsel to 
redirect his request to the Board’”; and that Ward was a co-
administrator because “a Notice [from the plan] advis[ed] 
10 
 
participants to contact the Board or Ward if they ha[d] 
additional questions[.]”  (App. at 21 (citation omitted).)  As to 
the first argument, the District Court said that Bergamatto 
could not satisfy the requirements of equitable estoppel 
because he had provided no evidence “that he detrimentally 
relied on Ward’s alleged misrepresentations.”  (App. at 22.)  As 
to the second, it determined that the Notice “is not sufficient to 
support a finding that Ward was a co-administrator” because it 
“identifies Ward as Executive Director, not co-administrator, 
and merely states that he can answer relevant questions.”  
(App. at 22.) 
 




 On appeal, Bergamatto presses two claims: (1) that he 
is entitled to benefit accruals for the years he worked before 
October 2004; and (2) that Ward should be viewed as a de facto 
administrator of the pension plan and thus subject to liability 
                                              
7 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e).  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We exercise plenary review 
over the district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying 
the same standard that the court should have applied.”  Howley 
v. Mellon Fin. Corp., 625 F.3d 788, 792 (3d Cir. 2010).  
“Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing the facts in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled 




for failing to timely respond to Bergamatto’s correspondence.8  
Bergamatto contends that the District Court erred in resolving 
those claims against him and should have granted summary 
judgment in his favor under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
56(f).9  We disagree and, consequently, will affirm. 
 
A. Bergamtto’s Ineligibility for Benefit Accruals 
for Pre-October 2004 Service 
 With respect to his first claim, Bergamatto says that the 
Board of Trustees’ decision was arbitrary and capricious in that 
it erroneously relied on the “last year of credited service” 
clause of the 2015 plan to deny his request for benefit accruals 
for pre-October 2004 work.  In Bergamatto’s view, that clause 
is inapplicable because it “appears to apply to the entitlement 
to and calculation of the pension benefit but is silent as to 
benefit accruals and appears to be a rule of general 
application.”  (Opening Br. at 15.)  He says that the amendment 
granting benefit accruals for pre-October 2004 service for 
                                              
8 Bergamatto does not contend that the Board is liable 
for being unresponsive.  He also does not raise equitable 
estoppel or assert that the District Court’s rejection of his 
equitable estoppel argument was in error.  We therefore 
consider these arguments forfeited.  See In re: Asbestos Prods. 
Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 873 F.3d 232, 237 (3d Cir. 2017) (“As a 
general matter, an appellant waives an argument in support of 
reversal if it is not raised in the opening brief.”). 
 
9 Bergamatto did not move for summary judgment, but 
Rule 56(f) provides, in relevant part, that, “[a]fter giving notice 
and a reasonable time to respond, the court may … grant 
summary judgment for a nonmovant[.]”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). 
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workers such as him, as incorporated into the 2015 plan, should 
govern “because it directly addresses accruals.”  (Opening Br. 
at 15.)  He maintains that he is covered by the amendment 
because he was a participant in the plan after the amendment’s 
effective date of October 2012.   
 
 Bergamatto’s first claim arises under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(a)(1)(B), which permits “a participant in an ERISA 
benefit plan [who has been] denied benefits” to bring suit “to 
recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan.”  
Howley v. Mellon Fin. Corp., 625 F.3d 788, 792 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Where a plan administrator possesses “discretionary authority 
to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of 
the plan[,]” we review the administrator’s decision under an 
“abuse of discretion” standard10 or an “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard,11 which, in this context, are effectively 
the same.  Id. at 792, 793 n.6 (citation omitted); see also 
Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 121 n.2 (3d Cir. 
2012) (“We have clarified that ‘[i]n the ERISA context, the 
arbitrary and capricious and abuse of discretion standards of 
review are essentially identical.’” (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted)).  Here, both the 2015 and 2010 plans grant 
                                              
10 “An administrator’s decision constitutes an abuse of 
discretion only if it is ‘without reason, unsupported by 
substantial evidence or erroneous as a matter of law.’”  Howley, 
625 F.3d at 792 (citation omitted). 
 
11 “An administrator’s decision is arbitrary and 
capricious if it is without reason, unsupported by substantial 
evidence or erroneous as a matter of law.”  Fleisher v. Standard 
Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 121 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
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the Board such discretionary authority, and it is undisputed that 
the Board possesses it.   
 
 Under our broadly deferential standard of review, we 
first consider whether the language of an ERISA plan is 
ambiguous, i.e., “subject to reasonable alternative 
interpretations.”  Bill Gray Enters., Inc. Emp. Health & 
Welfare Plan v. Gourley, 248 F.3d 206, 218 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(citations omitted).  If the plan’s language is unambiguous, “we 
will not set aside the administrator’s interpretations … as long 
as those interpretations are ‘reasonably consistent’ with the 
plan’s text[.]”12  Dowling v. Pension Plan for Salaried Emps. 
of Union Pac. Corp. & Affiliates, 871 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 
2017) (quoting Fleisher, 679 F.3d at 121).  “If the reviewing 
court determines the terms of a plan document are ambiguous, 
it must take [an] additional step and analyze whether the plan 
administrator’s interpretation of the document is reasonable.”  
Bill Gray Enters., 248 F.3d at 218. 
 
                                              
12 In assessing whether an administrator’s interpretation 
is “reasonably consistent” with plan language, we are not 
considering whether the interpretation is one reasonable 
alternative.  By definition, when plan terms are clear, they have 
only one meaning and are “unsuited to any further 
interpretation.”  Funk v. CIGNA Grp. Ins., 648 F.3d 182, 192 
(3d Cir. 2011), abrogated on other grounds by Montanile v. 
Bd. of Trs. of the Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health Benefit Plan, 
136 S. Ct. 651, 656-57 & n.2 (2016).  What we are doing, 
instead, is considering whether the administrator acted within 
the scope of the plan’s unambiguous terms while engaging in 
“straightforward Plan execution[.]”  Id. at 192 & n.12. 
14 
 
 Bergamatto’s argument fails at the first step because the 
plan language at issue here is unambiguous and the Board’s 
decision is “reasonably consistent” with that language.  The 
2015 plan states expressly that “[t]he provisions of the Plan in 
effect during the Participant’s last Year of Credited Service 
shall be applied to determine the Participant’s right to benefit 
and the amount thereof.”13  (App. at 70.)  The original 2010 
plan contains the same “last year of credited service” clause 
and directly forbids workers hired between October 1996 and 
September 2004 from earning benefit accruals for pre-October 
2004 work.14  And, the effective date of the 2013 amendment 
that changed that restriction and authorized such benefit 
accruals was October 1, 2012, well after Bergamatto’s last year 
of credited service in 2010.  The language of the un-amended 
2010 plan is thus controlling.  Given that Bergamatto was hired 
in 2000, he is subject to the benefit accrual exclusion for pre-
October 2004 work.  We cannot see how the 2015 and 2010 
plans could be read in any other way.  The Board’s decision 
                                              
13 The Board of Trustees considered the 2015 plan to be 
the operative one, and Bergamatto too relies on that plan to 
support his arguments.  We will assume that the 2015 plan is 
the appropriate one to look to, although we need not 
conclusively resolve whether the 2015 or 2010 plan governs 
because, in any event, the 2015 plan looks to the 2010 plan for 
the decisive language. 
 
14 Recall that the 2010 plan provides that any 
longshoreman hired “on or after October 1, 1996, and who was 
not a Participant as of September 30, 2004 … shall not be 
entitled to accrue credited service for pension benefit accrual 
purposes under the Plan for any hours of employment earned 
prior to October 1, 2004.”  (Supp. App. at 10-11.)   
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tracks that reading and is thus “reasonably consistent” – in fact, 
totally consistent – with the unambiguous language of the 
plans.   
 
 Bergamatto’s suggestion that the “last year of credited 
service” clause does not encompass benefit accruals is 
unpersuasive.  That clause, under both the 2015 and 2010 
plans, is framed expansively, covering any term used to 
determine a participant’s right to benefits and the amount 
thereof.  The clause, on its face, encompasses anything that 
could affect the benefits a worker receives, and it is hard to 
imagine how the accrual of benefits could fall outside its reach.  
Indeed, under both the 2015 and 2010 plans, “Accrued 
Benefit” is defined as the monthly pension benefit – i.e., the 
amount of benefit – that a participant in the plan would be 
entitled to receive if certain conditions were met.  (App. at 48; 
Supp. App. at 14.)  And Bergamatto necessarily concedes that 
benefit accruals affect the amount of a pension, given that he 
has consistently sought benefit accruals for additional years in 
order to increase his pension.   
 
 In light of all that, Bergamatto’s remaining arguments 
are unavailing.  His assertion that the amendment should 
govern since it directly addresses benefit accruals fails 
because, if the “last year of credited service” clause applies to 
benefit accruals (and it does), the 2010 provisions relating to 
benefit accruals must control.  No one disputes that 
Bergamatto’s last year of credited service was 2010.  And, 
again, because that was his last credited year, the 2010 
provisions govern.  Bergamatto’s argument that he was a 
participant in 2012 – when the amendment authorizing the 





 In sum, the plan language is unambiguous; the Board’s 
interpretation aligns with that language; and Bergamatto’s first 
claim fails.15 
 
B. The “De Facto” Plan Administrator Theory 
 As to Bergamatto’s second claim, he cites 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(c) and says that “a plan administrator who fails or 
refuses to comply with a request for information which the 
administrator is required by law to provide to a participant or 
beneficiary within 30 days is subject to a penalty of $100.00 
per day.”  (Opening Br. at 17.)  He then asserts that Ward failed 
to respond to his request for “a copy of the pertinent plan 
provisions or a summary plan description” within that 30-day 
period.  (Opening Br. at 17.)  Bergamatto maintains that Ward 
                                              
15 Bergamatto’s arguments rely on our decision in 
Moench, in which we adopted “factors to consider in 
determining whether an interpretation of a plan is 
reasonable[.]”  62 F.3d at 566; see also Howley, 625 F.3d at 
795 (noting that we consider the Moench factors “[i]n 
determining whether an administrator’s interpretation of a plan 
is reasonable”).  He frames all of his arguments using Moench, 
and he asserts that the Board’s interpretation would frustrate 
the goals of the plan, which is an argument tied specifically to 
the Moench factors.   
The Moench factors, however, are inapposite here.  
They apply in evaluating the reasonableness of an 
administrator’s interpretation.  But we only move to that 
inquiry if we decide that the terms of a plan document are 
ambiguous.  Bill Gray Enters., 248 F.3d at 218, 220 n.12; see 
supra note 11.  In the present case, the plan is clear. 
17 
 
should thus be penalized because, even though he has the title 
of Executive Director of the plan, he is a de facto plan 
administrator.  According to Bergamatto, “Ward appeared to 
function in all respects as a plan administrator” – for example, 
answering participants and beneficiaries’ questions, supplying 
them with information they requested, and providing summary 
plan descriptions – and that, “more importantly, he never 
disavowed the title.”  (Opening Br. at 18.)  As the District 
Court noted and Bergamatto acknowledges, a majority of our 
sister circuits have rejected the de facto administrator theory.  
He nevertheless asserts that we should not follow those other 
courts. 
 
 His claim arises under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(A), 
which allows a participant or beneficiary to sue “for the relief 
provided for in [29 U.S.C. § 1132(c).]”  29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(a)(1)(A).  The specific provision at issue is 
§ 1132(c)(1), which provides, in relevant part: 
 
Any administrator … who fails or refuses to 
comply with a request for any information which 
such administrator is required by this subchapter 
to furnish to a participant or beneficiary (unless 
such failure or refusal results from matters 
reasonably beyond the control of the 
administrator) by mailing the material requested 
to the last known address of the requesting 
participant or beneficiary within 30 days after 
such request may in the court’s discretion be 
personally liable to such participant or 
beneficiary in the amount of up to $100 a day 
from the date of such failure or refusal, and the 
18 
 
court may in its discretion order such other relief 
as it deems proper. 
Id. § 1132(c)(1) (emphasis added).16  In short, that provision 
allows suit against an administrator for not responding to 
requests for certain information. 
 
 Ward, however, does not formally qualify as an 
“administrator” for purposes of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1).  Under 
ERISA, the word “administrator” is defined as “the person 
specifically so designated by the terms of the instrument under 
which the plan is operated[,]” if there is such a designation.17  
Id. § 1002(16)(A).  Both the 2015 and 2010 plans designate the 
Board of Trustees – and only the Board of Trustees – as the 
administrator.18   
                                              
16 For instance, 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4) requires “[t]he 
administrator” to, “upon written request of any participant or 
beneficiary, furnish a copy of the latest updated summary, plan 
description, and the latest annual report, any terminal report, 
the bargaining agreement, trust agreement, contract, or other 
instruments under which the plan is established or operated.”  
29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4). 
 
17 Otherwise, the “administrator” is “the plan sponsor” 
or, if “an administrator is not designated and a plan sponsor 
cannot be identified, such other person as the Secretary [of 
Labor] may by regulation prescribe.”  29 U.S.C. 
§ 1002(16)(A). 
 
18 Bergamatto asserts that Ward should be viewed as a 
co-administrator because a Notice from the plan told 




 That leads to the question of whether a person, like 
Ward, who does not fit the statutory definition of 
“administrator” may be liable under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1) as 
a de facto administrator.  We have not previously addressed 
that question.  Most courts that have, though, have rejected the 
idea.  See Ibson v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., 877 F.3d 
384, 390-91 (8th Cir. 2017); Mondry v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. 
Co., 557 F.3d 781, 793-94 (7th Cir. 2009); Sgro v. Danone 
Waters of N. Am., Inc., 532 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(citing Moran v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 872 F.2d 296, 299-300 
(9th Cir. 1989)); Krauss v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 517 F.3d 
614, 631 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Lee v. Burkhart, 991 F.2d 1004, 
1010 n.5 (2d Cir. 1993)); Averhart v. US WEST Mgmt. Pension 
Plan, 46 F.3d 1480, 1489-90 (10th Cir. 1994); see also Conn. 
Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Humble Surgical Hosp., L.L.C., 878 F.3d 
478, 486 (5th Cir. 2017) (observing that “[t]he Fifth Circuit has 
never adopted the de facto plan administrator theory[,]” that 
“[t]he de facto administrator argument has been flatly rejected 
by at least eight circuits[,]” and that “[a]nother two circuits 
‘have refused to extend the de facto administrator doctrine to 
an insurance company involved in claims handling,’” as in the 
case at bar (third alteration in original) (citations omitted));19 
                                              
or Ward if they have questions or to request additional 
information.”  (Opening Br. at 18.)  But that Notice does not 
change who the plans specify as administrator, and the Notice 
characterizes Ward as “Executive Director,” not administrator.  
(D. Ct. D.I. 11-2, at *20.) 
 
19 The Fifth Circuit has not clarified whether Humble 
constituted a wholesale rejection of the de facto administrator 
theory.  It has since cited that case for the proposition that “the 
20 
 
Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 1134, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 
1989) (concluding that an insurer could not be liable under 29 
U.S.C. § 1132(c) because it was “nowhere designated by the 
plan as ‘administrator’” and no one had suggested that the 
insurer “fit[] within the statutory definition of ‘plan 
sponsor’”).20  Only two appellate courts appear to have adopted 
the theory,21 Rosen v. TRW, Inc., 979 F.2d 191, 193-94 (11th 
                                              
Fifth Circuit does not recognize a de facto administrator 
doctrine in the context of an insurance company involved in 
claims handling.”  N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co. v. 
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 898 F.3d 461, 483 & n.87 (5th Cir. 2018) 
(emphasis added). 
 
20 The D.C. Circuit has not cited Davis or addressed the 
de facto administrator issue since, so the scope of that decision 
is not wholly clear.  Cf. Law v. Ernst & Young, 956 F.2d 364, 
374 (1st Cir. 1992) (distinguishing Davis on the ground that it 
“involved [an attempt] to recover against entities which were 
clearly distinct from the plan administrator and which were not 
shown to have exercised actual control over the administrator’s 
functions”).  At least one court, however, has read Davis as 
rejecting the de facto administrator theory.  Jones v. UOP, 16 
F.3d 141, 145 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 
21 Two other Courts of Appeals have suggested that they 
might adopt the de facto administrator theory in the appropriate 
case.  The Sixth Circuit has remanded where “the record did 
not sufficiently explain the relationship between the employer 
and the plan administrator for it to determine liability.”  Gore 
v. El Paso Energy Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, 477 F.3d 
833, 843 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Minadeo v. ICI Paints, 398 
F.3d 751, 759 (6th Cir. 2005)).  But see Mondry, 557 F.3d at 
21 
 
Cir. 1992); Law v. Ernst & Young, 956 F.2d 364, 374 (1st Cir. 
1992), and both have done so only to a limited degree, see 
Oliver v. Coca Cola Co., 497 F.3d 1181, 1194 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(“Rosen applied the de facto administrator doctrine to 
employers, not to third-party administrative services 
providers.”), vacated in part on other grounds by Oliver v. 
Coca Cola Co., 506 F.3d 1316, 1317 (11th Cir. 2007); 
Tetreault v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 769 F.3d 49, 60 
(1st Cir. 2014) (“Law was careful to distinguish the case before 
it, which involved an employer with ‘little, if any, separate 
identity’ from the internal retirement committee that had been 
designated as the ‘plan administrator,’ from cases involving 
‘attempts to recover against entities which were clearly distinct 
from the plan administrator.’” (citation omitted)). 
 
                                              
794 (concluding that Gore supports the view that Courts of 
Appeals “have held that liability under section 1132(c)(1) is 
confined to the plan administrator”).  Similarly, the Fourth 
Circuit has suggested that a non-administrator could assume 
the administrator’s duty to provide documents and be subject 
to suit.  Coleman v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 969 F.2d 54, 62 
n.3 (4th Cir. 1992).  But see id. at 62 (holding that an insurer 
had no duty to provide documents as an administrator and 
reasoning that, “[w]hile it is true that an insurer will usually 
have administrative responsibilities with respect to the review 
of claims under the policy, that does not give this court license 
to ignore the statute’s definition of plan administrator and to 
impose on [the insurer] the plan administrator’s notification 
duties”); Jones, 16 F.3d at 145 (indicating that Coleman 
rejected the de facto administrator theory). 
22 
 
 We are persuaded by the weight of authority, as well as 
the plain text and character of the statutes at issue,22 and so 
reject the de facto administrator theory.  As set out above, § 
1132(c)(1) imposes liability only on administrators.  We have 
said that “administrator” is a “term[] of art under ERISA[,]” 
defined, with certain exceptions, “as ‘the person specifically so 
designated by the terms of the instrument under which the plan 
is operated.’”  Groves v. Modified Ret. Plan for Hourly Paid 
Emps. of Johns Manville Corp. & Subsidiaries, 803 F.2d 109, 
116 (3d Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).  To treat those who do 
not fully satisfy that “detailed definition[]” as administrators 
“would ‘slight[ ] the wording of the statute[.]’”  Id. (second 
alteration in original) (citation omitted).  We cannot allow that, 
for three reasons. 
 
 First, the Supreme Court has taught, quite forcefully, 
that courts should avoid reading remedies into ERISA’s 
carefully-crafted enforcement scheme: 
 
The … carefully integrated civil enforcement 
provisions found in § 502(a) … provide strong 
evidence that Congress did not intend to 
authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to 
incorporate expressly.  The assumption of 
inadvertent omission is rendered especially 
suspect upon close consideration of ERISA’s 
                                              
22 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16) (defining “administrator”); 
id. § 1024(b)(4) (mandating that it is the “administrator” that 
“shall” furnish certain documentation to the participant or 
beneficiary); id. § 1132(c)(1) (specifying that it is an 
“administrator” that may be “personally liable” for failing to 
comply with the statutory duty of furnishing information). 
23 
 
interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent 
remedial scheme, which is in turn part of a 
“comprehensive and reticulated statute.” … We 
are reluctant to tamper with an enforcement 
scheme crafted with such evident care as the one 
in ERISA. 
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146-47 
(1985) (citation omitted); see also Hozier v. Midwest 
Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1167, 1169-70 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(relying on Russell to conclude that a “rather freewheeling 
statutory construction [of ERISA], even though embarked 
upon to vindicate correctly perceived underlying purposes, has 
little place in the context of a carefully balanced and reticulated 
statute like ERISA”).  
 
 Second, § 1132(c) “is a penal provision” and, as such, 
“should be leniently and narrowly construed[.]”  Groves, 803 
F.2d at 111, 118; see also Haberern v. Kaupp Vascular 
Surgeons Ltd. Defined Benefit Pension Plan, 24 F.3d 1491, 
1505 (3d Cir. 1994) (“We start our discussion … [concerning 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1)] by pointing out that statutory penalty 
provisions are construed strictly.”).   
 
 Third, we have in fact consistently construed this 
statutory penalty provision narrowly and there is no reason to 
depart from that approach.  See Kollman v. Hewitt Assocs., 
LLC, 487 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2007) (reversing the district 
court’s award of a penalty under § 1132(c) because the 
applicable ERISA provision pertained to fiduciaries, not plan 
administrators, and the obligation to provide information was 
contained in the Plan, not ERISA); Haberern, 24 F.3d at 1505-
06 (setting aside the § 1132(c) penalty because the plaintiff’s 
24 
 
request, instead of seeking documentation that a plan 
administrator must provide, simply asked to schedule a 
meeting); Groves, 803 F.2d at 111 (affirming the district 
court’s determination that a § 1132(c) sanction could not be 
imposed upon a plan administrator because ERISA imposed 
the duty to furnish documentation “exclusively on ‘the plan,’ 
not upon the ‘plan administrator[,]’” and limiting liability for 
the administrator’s breach of a regulation because § 1132(c) 
applied to failures to comply with a request under “this 
subchapter[,]” which did not encompass regulations 
promulgated under the statute). 
 
 In short, we must restrict application of the title 
“administrator” to those who fit the statutory definition and not 
stretch the term to authorize penalties against others whom a 
disappointed plan participant might like to reach.  That means 
that Ward is not an administrator, “de facto” or otherwise.23  At 
                                              
 23 That conclusion is not altered by the fact that the 2015 
and 2010 plans delegate to the Executive Pension Director the 
Board’s “power and authority to process and approve all non-
disputed applications for pension benefits and to commence 
timely payments of such benefits[,]” subject to ratification by 
the Board.  (Supp. App. at 73; D. Ct. D.I. 31-3, at *276.)  That 
language does not show that the Executive Pension Director is 
the statutory administrator, even for disclosure purposes.  
Indeed, the plans require the Board to “make available to the 
Fund’s Participants and beneficiaries such reports and other 
documents as are required by ERISA.”  (Supp. App. at 68; D. 
Ct. D.I. 31-3, at *272.)  Moreover, a non-administrator does 
not become an administrator simply by virtue of possessing 
responsibilities under a plan.  See Ross v. Rail Car Am. Grp. 
Disability Income Plan, 285 F.3d 735, 743 (8th Cir. 2002) 
25 
 
least in this context, then, there is no such thing as a “de facto 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
                                              
(“Canada Life admits that it had control over claims under the 
policy, but assuming that function did not transform it into the 
Plan Administrator.”); Averhart, 46 F.3d at 1489-90 (“[E]ven 
where ‘company personnel other than the plan administrator 
routinely assume responsibility for answering requests from 
plan participants and beneficiaries … [t]he statutory liability 
for failing to provide requested information remains with the 
designated plan administrator[.]’” (second alteration in 
original)). 
